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Abstract: Encouraged by the early success of using
dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) against malaria,
the World Health Organization (WHO) embarked on the
Global Malaria Eradication Program (GMEP) in 1955.
Fourteen years later, the campaign was discontinued
when it was recognised that eradication was not
achievable with the available means in many areas,
although the long-term goal remained unchanged.
During the GMEP, malaria was permanently eliminated
from many regions. In other areas, however, substantial
gains were lost in resurgences, sometimes of epidemic
proportions. During the 1970s and 1980s, because of
economic and financial crises, international support for
malaria control declined rapidly, but in the past decade,
following increasing demands from endemic countries
and promising results from scaling up of control activities,
interest in malaria elimination and the long-term goal of
eradication has received international political and
financial support. In 2007, there was a renewed call for
malaria eradication and a consultative process to define a
research and development agenda for malaria eradication
(malERA) was established. Lessons learned from the GMEP
(1955–1969) highlight the fact that no single strategy can
be applicable everywhere and that a long-term commit-
ment with a flexible strategy that includes community
involvement, integration with health systems, and the
development of agile surveillance systems is needed.
Introduction
The mechanisms of malaria transmission were first elucidated at
the end of the 19th century. This research meant that
malariologists could at last explain the observed effects of
traditional control measures, such as drainage of marshes and
mosquito nets, and develop better approaches to control malaria.
Thanks to increasing public and political support, the early days of
the 20th century witnessed the deployment of an increasing
number of interventions against malaria. However, large-scale
implementation of most of the proposed measures had severe
operational and financial limitations, and some strategies were
found to be suitable only in particular social, ecological, and
epidemiological conditions.
The best approach to malaria control became the subject of
intense debate during the first decades of the century. Experts
were roughly divided into two major conceptual camps. Some
(e.g., Ross, Gorgas, and Watson) favoured large-scale campaigns
of vector control or mass drug administration to prevent and
rapidly solve the problem. Others (the Malaria Commission of the
League of Nations and the so-called Italian and Dutch schools)
advocated locally designed programs of progressive, albeit slow,
development of case management facilities and environmental
sanitation to stimulate health and economic development, and
diminish malaria morbidity and mortality. While the first group
achieved spectacular successes, such as the interruption of malaria
and yellow fever transmission during the construction of the
Panama Canal and the elimination of the introduced highly
efficient African vector Anopheles gambiae in Brazil, sustainability
seemed to require the solid public health foundations envisaged by
the second approach. Thus, in 1939 Boyd summarised the
prevailing public health point of view as: ‘‘malaria control should
not be a campaign, it should be a policy, a long-term program. It
cannot be accomplished or maintained by spasmodic effort. It
requires the adoption of a practicable program, the reasonable
continuity of which will be sustained for a long term of years’’ [1].
It is hoped that the following review of the history of the Global
Malaria Eradication Program (GMEP) (1955–1969) will encour-
age current and future antimalarial programmes that are pursuing
new goals to develop flexible strategies on the basis of analyses of
their own history and to strengthen their existing expertise rather
than relying on new cadres to adopt an imported strategy, as did
the GMEP.
The Impact of DDT
The development of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT)
as the first residual insecticide in the early 1940s brought about a
radical change in malaria control strategies. Killing indoor resting
adult mosquitoes with insecticides sprayed on household walls had
started in the 1930s using pyrethrum extracts, but had limited
applicability because weekly applications were needed. DDT,
which was first used against malaria by the US Army during
World War II, required only semestrial or annual applications.
This long residual effect meant that malaria control could be
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organisation to handle the supply, transport, and distribution
networks required for regular and correct application.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, after numerous field
trials, more and more national control programmes adopted DDT
spraying. These programmes showed that transmission could be
interrupted and that malaria did not necessarily return if spraying
stopped [2,3]. DDT appeared to be effective everywhere, making
eradication of malaria a feasible objective. However, DDT’s
effectiveness against agricultural pests and household insects made
prices soar, and its widespread application rapidly led to the first
appearance of vector resistance to DDT in Greece in 1951 [4].
In this context, it was felt that progress at a global level would
require more than the slow recruitment of political support
country by country. Rather, it would be necessary to mobilise
political commitment at the UN level and gain the financial
support of UN agencies and of the United States, where a strong
lobby was formed to obtain funds for global malaria eradication
[5]. Further support for a global eradication approach was
provided during the 1950s by Macdonald’s mathematical model,
which highlighted the great superiority of increasing adult vector
mortality over mere reduction in density [6–8]. Malaria
eradication was also advocated for with economic and political
arguments that shifted from the impact of malaria on the local
economies, to its influence on the price of imported goods and the
risk that malaria could ‘‘predispose a community to infection with
political germs that can delay and destroy freedom’’ as stated by
Paul Russell, the Rockefeller malariologist who defended the
WHO malaria eradication proposal at the 8th World Health
Assembly (WHA) [9].
The GMEP was approved by the 8th WHA in Mexico in 1955
[10]. WHO was given the mandate to provide technical advice
and coordinate resources, but not to act as ‘‘directing and
coordinating authority’’ as proposed in the draft resolution
submitted by 28 countries [11]. The 1955 WHA resolution also
established a Malaria Eradication Special Account to channel
public and private contributions [10], which opened the hope of
general availability of funds.
Although approved by an overwhelming majority, the decision
to launch the GMEP was not without controversy. Advocates of
the eradication approach highlighted the emergence of mosquito
resistance to DDT that, in their view, necessitated the launch of
the GMEP before the world lost its most promising weapon. They
also argued that eradication was, in the long term, financially more
attractive than control. Conversely, critics of the campaign
doubted the feasibility of eradication in vast areas that had poor
communications and adverse environments and that lacked public
health systems. They also emphasized the poor understanding of
the implications of undertaking a malaria eradication campaign,
both in terms of its cost and of the risk to the population posed by
lost immunity if protection had to be interrupted [12].
In 1956, the WHO Expert Committee on Malaria was called to
design the eradication campaign (Figure 1). The Committee felt
that they were shaping a strong political force and that they had
the opportunity of freeing malaria control from the frustrations of
bureaucracy by prescribing autonomous organisations capable of
achieving the precise execution of interventions. In contrast to
control (measures of indefinite duration aimed at reducing the
incidence of malaria), eradication was defined as ‘‘the ending of
the transmission of malaria and the elimination of the reservoir of
Summary Points
N An examination of the evolution, implementation, and
outcome of the Global Malaria Eradication Programme
provides useful lessons for current elimination/eradica-
tion attempts
N Programmes should develop flexible strategies, integrat-
ed into the national health infrastructure rather than
only implementing vertical malaria elimination cam-
paigns, in order to ensure sustainability
N Professional cadres that can adapt the strategy to the
local epidemiology and that can develop an effective
surveillance system deeply rooted in the communities
should be strengthened
N To solve problems and to review strategies, close links
should be established with field and laboratory research
N Communities should be encouraged and supported to
adopt malaria elimination as their own goal, reporting
abnormal situations and creating a demand for effec-
tiveness
Figure 1. Phases of the Malaria Eradication Campaign as established by WHO in 1963. Image credit: Fusio ´n Creativa.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000412.g001
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such a degree of perfection that when it comes to an end, there is
no resumption of transmission’’ [13].
The Expert Committee seems not to have realised that in
creating such executive machinery, they were transforming the
practice of malariology. The administration of such gigantic
enterprises was a totally absorbing job; up to then, malariologists
had been field scientists guiding governments and local authorities
by trying to solve a problem. Now malariologists were forced to
become managers trying to accomplish a complex task.
Moreover, the global eradication campaign was based on the
assumption that all the necessary knowledge for eradication was
available, that further research was superfluous, and that
eradication required a rigid discipline in which local deviations
from a centrally defined plan must be prevented. Thus, malaria
eradication acquired the characteristics of an ideology and control
was demonised. This attitude is clearly illustrated by the statement
of the UNICEF Regional Director to the Executive Board:
‘‘Between malaria control and eradication there is as great a
difference as that between night and day. Control … is a primitive
technique. Now we know exactly … the schedule of an eradication
campaign which will last four or five years, followed by three years
of consolidation’’ [14].
This overoptimistic environment prevented the recognition of
general problems in the conception of the campaign, which was
based on an exaggerated extrapolation of early local experiences
that, although successful, represented a very limited variety of
epidemiological situations. Actually, it was obvious from the start
that nobody knew how to deal with the problems of tropical
Africa; this was one of the main objections to the GMEP in the
1955 WHA.
A serious consequence of that exaggerated confidence was the
belief that the wide experience and knowledge of the old
malariologists was superfluous and even counterproductive,
particularly if they persisted in modifying the eradication strategy
locally. Therefore, eradication campaigns were entrusted to new,
preferably young ‘‘malariologists,’’ trained in ‘‘Malaria Eradica-
tion Training Centres’’ established by WHO in several countries.
GMEP interventions consisted basically of indoor residual
spraying with DDT or other approved insecticides. The Expert
Committee developed standard guidelines for action on the basis
of vertical, time-limited interventions clearly distinct from previous
measures. Destruction of mosquito breeding marshes, prevention
of mosquito bites, and other measures traditionally used in malaria
control were abandoned, depicted not only as unnecessary but as
antagonistic to the higher goal of eradication. Moreover,
international funds became available only to countries adopting
the goal and the means set by the WHO expert committee reports.
The fundamental principles of the campaign—total coverage
and perfection in the execution of operations—served as a stimulus
to those countries that already had, or could develop, the
infrastructure to mobilize and use the new resources to eliminate
malaria from their territories. Many other countries, following the
Committee’s directives, established new autonomous structures
that favoured the delivery of services over the creation of a
demand and the participation of local communities. These
autonomous structures often became ‘‘self-perpetuating,’’ dissoci-
ated from the general health services and incapable of adaptation
to changes in the epidemiological situation.
Outcomes of the Campaign
It is not necessary to emphasize the positive contributions of the
campaign to world health, which include: (1) achieving a
considerable reduction in the geographical distribution of malaria
although most of this reduction was in areas that already had well
functioning control programmes; (2) being the first global health
programme aimed at ‘‘total coverage’’; (3) leading to the
establishment, in some countries, of effective although partial
contact with the communities, through networks of ‘‘voluntary
collaborators’’ for diagnosis and treatment; (4) making a serious
attempt to use local maps to guide its activities, even if that
practice was later neglected; and (5) having an important influence
on the subsequent planning of health programmes.
Nevertheless, as more and more countries joined the campaign
and reported the achievement of total coverage with attack
measures, often after strenuous efforts to reach remote areas,
emerging problems were overlooked. Even the confirmation of
chloroquine resistance in 1960, after treatment failures had been
reported since the late 1950s from Venezuela and Thailand, was
not given its full epidemiological importance because the
campaign still hoped to interrupt transmission by spraying. In
addition, it was assumed that the well-known periodic epidemic
risk in certain areas would not return after local interruption of
transmission. It was only in the mid-1960s that the existence of
‘‘problem areas’’ was recognised, after evidence of vector
avoidance of contact with the insecticide in southern Mexico
was confirmed.
As mentioned above, antimalarial interventions other than
indoor residual spraying were abandoned. Even the use of
antimalarial drugs as a complementary measure was considered
redundant at the beginning. At the same time, there was a general
disregard for social and cultural barriers, which often prevented
the acceptance of the campaign activities in many of the ‘‘remote
areas.’’ Moreover, even though most country programmes
established health education units, these were rarely given the
recognition or the means needed to provide a useful contribution
[5].
Malaria Resurgences after Interruption of
Transmission
During the 1960s, not only did some areas fail to advance as
expected, but other areas saw resurgences of malaria after
relatively long periods of interruption of transmission. Some
resurgences were surprisingly serious epidemics that required the
reestablishment of spraying operations.
By 1962, it was already recognised that the consolidation phase
required an infrastructure capable of supporting epidemiological
surveillance. As a result, a new ‘‘pre-eradication programme’’ was
established, mainly for Africa, with the aim of developing the
required health infrastructure in parallel with the preparatory
phase of the campaign. Unfortunately, there were no models of the
minimum infrastructure required and the development of the
‘‘basic health services’’ continued to respond mainly to financial
and political motivations.
Moreover, although by the mid-1950s, there was relatively wide
experience in the use of DDT, nobody had a clear idea of how to
organise a surveillance system capable of detecting the last cases of
malaria. The sixth report of the Expert Committee [13] suggested
the creation of surveillance systems involving direct—mainly
house-to-house visits—and indirect means, such as engaging
official or unofficial health services, of case detection. It also
suggested that the search should be intensified as the number of
cases decreased to manageable proportions.
However, the campaign managers considered terms like ‘‘man-
ageable proportions’’ too vague and demanded clearer and more
precise prescriptions. The Expert Committee obliged in its 8th and
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coverage with spraying (the end of the attack phase). These indicators
were an annual parasite incidence of ,0.5/1,000 and ,0.1/1,000 (in
the 8th and in the 10th reports, respectively), an annual blood
examination rate of .10% of the population of the malarious areas,
and a slide positivity rate of ,5%. Although the committee insisted
on the need to be guided by the experience and the capacity of the
local services, campaign managers rapidly adopted these figures as
thresholds for advancing through the phases of the campaign.
As problems became more widely recognised through the
1960s, there was some renewed interest in malaria research.
WHO, for example, set up a programme for coordinating the
development of new insecticides for public health and supported
pilot projects to interrupt malaria transmission in Africa.
Nevertheless, it was the spread of drug resistance in Southeast
Asia and increased involvement of the US in the Vietnam war
during the second half of the decade that led the US army to
launch an intense malaria research programme aimed at the
development of new antimalarials, but including studies on
parasite biology, immune responses, in vitro culture, and the
development of new animal models. McGregor described this
development as: ‘‘throughout the world support for further
research into malaria, even that concerned with insecticides and
chemotherapeutics, contracted swiftly. Worse still, the apparent
imminent demise of a once important disease removed the
necessity for training scientists in malariology. It took 10 years and
a war to halt this tragic trend’’ [15].
After Global Eradication: A Return to Control
In 1967, as more areas reverted from consolidation to attack
phase, the WHA requested a reexamination of the global strategy.
The evaluation illustrated the slowing down of the global campaign
[16], particularly after 1966 (Figure 2). GMEP also faced financial
constraints during these years, as the US contributions to the WHO
Malaria Special Account, which represented more than 85% of the
total, were stopped in 1963, considerably reducing WHO’s capacity
to provide technical assistance [17].
An event that undoubtedly influenced the WHA was the 1968–
1969 epidemic resurgence of malaria in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), a
country that had been considered a model for the training of
malariologists. The surveillance system in this country had not
reacted to 4 years of clear deterioration (1963–1967), nor had it
taken into account 30 years of accumulated knowledge about the
periodicity of epidemic risk in the country.
In 1969, 14 years after the launch of the GMEP, the 22nd World
Health Assembly had to recognise that there were countries where
eradication was not feasible in the short term, and that a strategy of
control was an appropriate step towards future eradication in those
areas. ‘‘In the regions where eradication does not yet seem feasible,
Figure 2. Progress of the campaign, presented to the 8th WHA [16]. Image credit: Fusio ´n Creativa.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000412.g002
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and may be regarded as a necessary and valid step towards the
ultimate goal of eradication,’’ the Assemblystated,while reaffirming
that eradication remained the ultimate objective [10].
Malaria Control during the 1970s and 1980s
Faced with the recognition that malaria eradication could not
be conceived as a short-term programme, UNICEF and other
major collaborating agencies withdrew their support to malaria
programmes in favour of general health programmes. The
economic crisis of the early 1970s also contributed to the
accelerated contraction of funding for malaria control. Moreover,
oil shortages caused considerable increases in insecticide prices
that further deteriorated the financial situation of the campaigns.
This reduction of programme resources, aided by a strong La Nin ˜a
in 1975–1976, resulted in severe epidemics in several countries,
particularly in the Indian subcontinent and Turkey.
Another problem that became evident during the 1970s was the
attrition of professional staff. The lack of professional incentives as
a result of the routine work imposed during the GMEP had
reduced the professional cadres. At the same time, the organisation
of spraymen into unions made it increasingly difficult to reduce
this unqualified labour force.
All these factors combined such that the campaigns became less
and less capable of reorienting their strategy. This lack of
flexibility, together with the drastic reduction of their operational
capacity, led to the so-called ‘‘fire-fighting’’ strategy. Paradoxical-
ly, in the name of maintaining previous achievements, operations
were continued in the best protected areas, resulting in resources
being concentrated in the areas with lesser problems.
To make matters worse, in response to the economic crisis,
many countries encouraged the exploitation of their natural
resources. Some, like Brazil or Indonesia, actively supported the
colonisation of their extensive primary forests by agriculture and
mining, a process supported by the construction of penetrating
roads. These policies resulted in massive outbreaks of malaria that,
because of the relative weakness of official malaria control,
encouraged an intensive trade of all kinds of antimalarial drugs,
thus contributing to the spread of drug resistance [18].
All these problems supported the view that progress required the
development of new tools and strategies and, in the mid 1970s,
WHO launched the Special Programme for Research and Training
in Tropical Diseases (TDR) in collaboration with the United
Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, in an effort
to reestablish the role of research in malaria control. Since its
establishment, the TDR has achieved important successes in the
development of new tools and in laboratory and field research.
Nevertheless, the ‘‘problem solving’’ approach of field malar-
iologists in the first half of the 20th century has not been recovered
in most programmes and the rift between control and research,
once described in India as ‘‘a curious rivalry between the malaria
programme and outside research bodies,’’ still persists. Most
research projects have little operational bearing on the control
programme and the latter lack ‘‘the capacity either to carry out
research, to guide it, to generate issues for research based on
analysis of incoming information, or to translate into operational
use research carried out by other institutions’’ [18].
Lessons Learnt from the GMEP by Antimalarial
and Other Health Programmes
Throughout the past decades, countries have tried to adapt to
changing situations within the constraints of their financial and
organizational limitations. These experiences show how antima-
larial and other programmes tried to implement lessons learned
from the GMEP, even though there were sometimes great gaps
between the formulation of a lesson and its application. These
lessons included:
(1) A public health service is needed to support malaria
surveillance, even though there are still major disagreements
among experts about when or how antimalarial programmes
should be integrated with the health services. Relevant to this
lesson, the WHO Registry of countries that have achieved
local malaria eradication, elimination in present terminology,
shows that a prerequisite for elimination may be the existence
of a previous prolonged control programme that has
contributed to the development of epidemiological services
and a rural public health service (Table 1). Tourism-oriented,
relatively rich islands maintain elimination through continu-
ous expensive mosquito control programmes. It should also be
recognised that countries included in the Registry were not
highly malarious, although some of them had foci of high
endemicity and areas subject to epidemic outbreaks.
(2) Control has to be supported with research. This lesson has led
to the considerable revival of malaria research since the 1970s,
but the relations between control programmes and research
institutions still need to be revived or strengthened.
(3) As highlighted by the Primary Health Care movement, active
participation of communities in the understanding of and
actions for the solution of their health problems needs to be
incorporated into antimalarial programmes. Although there
have been important local initiatives in the past, WHO has
only recently formulated a strategy for Community-based
Malaria Elimination. Conversely, it is worth recalling that the
setbacks and general lack of progress of the GMEP were
among the main stimuli for the generation of the primary
health care movement in the 1970s.
(4) More specifically, the GMEP’s ‘‘failure to achieve its
objective’’ was taken into consideration in the design of the
successful Intensified Smallpox Eradication Programme [19].
An important principle of this programme was that the
administrative structure and pattern of operations of each
national programme should be integrated into the health and
socio-cultural setting of the country. Fenner and coauthors
[20] noted that the programme’s success depended on stating
the strategic plan in terms of principles and illustrative
methodologies rather than in terms of directives and on
recognising that continuing field and laboratory research
would be essential. Another important principle of the
smallpox eradication programme was concentration on
investigating all outbreaks or clustering of cases, before
attempting to investigate each individual case. Although there
are obviously great differences in the epidemiology and the
response to control interventions between smallpox and
malaria, these strategic considerations should now be taken
into account in the malaria eradication programme where a
lack of flexibility, an incapacity to adapt to changing
situations, and a lack of coordination between control
programmes and research institutions have all been identified
as important obstacles to advancement in malaria control and
elimination [17,21,22]. Noteworthy in this respect is China’s
experience. Although not included in the WHO Registry
because only complete countries are included in this Registry,
China has eliminated malaria from most of its territory by
developing a control strategy on the basis of exhaustive
attention to case detection and management by epidemiolog-
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These services are firmly supported by political will at all
levels of society and deploy well-organised control measures
when they were needed for elimination of foci, all ‘‘in sensible
semi-defiance of WHO dictates,’’ according to Kidson [23].
Conclusions and Recommendations
Although not a comprehensive coverage of the problems of
malaria control, the authors’ experience and the broad historical
considerations presented above, suggest the following conclusions,
which may be useful in planning new elimination programmes:
N It may be fair to say that there is no country that is still
endemic today where the malaria problem is so simple and
uniform that it can be solved by applying a single strategy.
N The GMEP generated heated debate that contrasted vertical
and horizontal approaches to malaria elimination. Historical
analysis suggests that, while sustainable elimination of an
endemic problem from a wide geographical area requires the
build up of a epidemiological services well rooted in the
communities, a well-organised, disciplined campaign is
required for the rapid solution of local problems, such as
outbreaks.
N It is essential to identify and study the physical, social, and
cultural barriers that have proved to be stumbling blocks to
malaria control in the past, and make all necessary efforts to
avoid them in future by encouraging better community
involvement and ownership.
N Programmes should be adequately integrated into the national
health infrastructure. Such integration will allow them to
benefit from available epidemiological services for communi-
cation and analysis. Programmes should also benefit from the
establishment of solid links with research and training
institutions, including organisations studying ecology, anthro-
pology, sociology, economic activities (e.g., agriculture,
forestry, mining, fishing, etc.), production systems, labour
relations, and population movements of endemic populations.
N Worryingly, the notion that problems can be solved before
they are fully understood still seems widespread. This attitude
is evidenced by the emphasis placed on scaling up control
interventions rather than on developing an epidemiological
infrastructure. While such scaling-up will most likely continue
to reduce transmission in many areas, the timely identification
and elimination of residual foci may not be possible unless
programmes reestablish strong professional cadres capable of
guiding flexible and adaptable action. That is, those involved
in elimination efforts need to not only apply accepted control
measures, but also to evaluate results and participate in
problem solving.
N Surveillance should not only aim to detect the last case, it
should be an essential instrument from the start, involved in
the identification and study of problem areas, beyond the limits
of administrative localities. As the elimination programme
advances, epidemiological investigations should concentrate
successively in the study of outbreaks or clustering of cases and
finally of individual case investigations.
Finally, it is necessary to break the ‘‘quasi-cyclical’’ alternation
between overoptimistic expectations and a ‘‘fire-fighting strategy.’’
If malaria eradication is ever to succeed, the fate stated in 1927 by
the Second Report of the Malaria Commission of the League of
Nations—‘‘The history of special antimalarial campaigns is chiefly
a record of exaggerated expectations followed sooner or later by
disappointment and abandonment of the work’’—must be
avoided.
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